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BUT WHERE'S THE CONTRACT? A 
TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR DAVID 
MCLAUCHLAN 
Amelia Keene and Sarah Leslie 
This article is a tribute to Professor David McLauchlan on the occasion of his 40th 
teaching anniversary. The first part is a personal recollection from each of the two 
authors. The second part is a joint case note.  It poses the question: how could a real 
estate firm who knew the vendor did not intend to appoint the firm as agent nevertheless 
have a legal right to withhold commission? In the decision of Nightingale v Barfoot Ltd, 
Venning J confirmed that the firm had such a right.  This article challenges the accuracy 
of that conclusion, suggesting that as there was no evidence to support the formation of an 
agency agreement, the real estate firm did not have the right to deduct commission. It 
analyses critically a number of the legal arguments raised in the case and those that 
should have been raised, including those concerning contract formation, the objective 
principle, promissory estoppel, and the effect of s 62 of the Real Estate Agents Act 1976 
and the Contracts Privity Act 1982.  Much responsibility for the outcome of the case must 
be pinned on counsel for the vendor, who failed to stop and ask himself "But Where’s The 
Contract"? 
I INTRODUCTION 
This article is written as a tribute to Professor David McLauchlan on the occasion of his 40th 
teaching anniversary. The first part is a personal recollection from each of the two authors. The 
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second part is a joint case note on Nightingale v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd.1 We argue that the case 
was incorrectly decided due to a failure to consider first principles of contract law. 
II PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS FROM AMELIA KEENE 
Professor McLauchlan lights fires of rebellion in many law students each year. He teaches 
respect for the law but not necessarily judges. According to the Professor, students should take their 
pronouncements on the law with a grain of salt. Students are encouraged to take a critical view of 
cases, and read each word carefully. Sometimes, they are required to trace back and read the reports 
of the old cases cited within the cases, although if the reporter was Espinasse,2 they should beware. 
Pollock CB recorded that "Mr Espinasse was deaf. He heard one half of a case and reported the 
other".3 Professor McLauchlan teaches his students to think for themselves.  
Known to most students simply as David or 'Dmac', he is the only lecturer I know of with a 
Facebook Appreciation Society and he has won many prizes for his teaching.4 His irreverent style 
and quick wit make many fans. Once, having failed to get any answer from a student named Scott, 
he complained to the class, "I thought he'd be Scott on, but I was wrong".  
He also understands how to make a point to technology-savvy students who increasingly turn up 
to class with laptops and iPhones, not pencil and paper. A student floundering under Socratic 
questioning on counsel's argument in the Boots Cash Chemists5 case was told to create a Facebook 
page so that he'd remember the mistake: the page is entitled "Richards [sic] wrong interpretation of 
council's [sic] arguement [sic] in Boots case" and has a proud 45 members, of whom I am one. 
David even joined the group to correct Richard's spelling and grammar. His classes are a 
combination of legal and practical teachings. Those who had him as a lecturer for Bridgewater v 
Leahy6 will remember him donning an outback hat and teaching the class as Bill York, a weathered, 
traditional old Australian farmer with a quite sure grasp of his faculties, despite what the High Court 
of Australia may have decided. Students are encouraged to "live" the cases discussed in class, to 
appreciate that judges are making decisions that sometimes have profound effects on the lives of 
real people, and to critique the judgments from that perspective. 
  
1 Nightingale v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd DC Auckland CIV-2008-004-875, 10 June 2009 [Nightingale 
(DC)]; appeal dismissed Nightingale v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-4073, 22 
October 2009 [Nightingale (HC)].  
2  As in Stilk v Myrick (1809) 6 Esp 129, 170 ER 851 (Assizes). 
3  Compare Stilk v Myrick [1809] 2 Camp 317, 170 ER 1168 (Assizes). 
4 Victoria University of Wellington Award for Special Academic Achievement in Teaching 2002; Victorias 
Award for Best Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, 2000, 2006, 2007, 2008; Salient's "Academic Idol" for 2006. 
5  Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists  (Southern) Ltd [1952] 2 QB 795 (QB).  
6  Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457.  
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After 40 years of teaching this year, one wonders whether he is looking for new challenges, but 
he is emphatic: "I've got the best job in the world". David's fondest memories are of his students, 
many of whom keep in touch and some even refer their difficult contract questions to him. Each 
teaching morning he arrives at law school at 7 am to re-read the cases he may have read a hundred 
times before and to ensure he is on top of his game: "Those students have paid to be there, and by 
golly, I'm going to give them their money's worth." Among those students, he can name many 
judges, politicians, silks and partners in commercial firms. Former students include the President of 
the Court of Appeal, Justice Mark O'Regan, the Solicitor-General, David Collins QC, the Attorney-
General, the Hon Christopher Finlayson, the Minister of Justice, the Hon Simon Power, and even 
the former Commissioner of Police, Howard Broad. In a recent Dominion Post interview,7 the latter 
recalled his best lesson learnt as being in David's Contract and Commercial Law classes: "He was an 
absolute stickler for detail, much more so than in any other classes I had ever attended". 
Professor Charles Rickett8 described David's scholarship as "marked by an appeal to practical 
reason and meticulous attention to detail".9 Having studied the Law of Contract with Professor 
McLauchlan, I can attest that his classes bear the same mark. They were at once frustrating and 
rewarding. He would chew through a whole row of students looking for an answer, sometimes for 
ten minutes or more. The questions I answered incorrectly haunt me to this day. Those classes truly 
inspired me to stick with law and created a passion for the subject of which I cannot be rid. They 
were a revelation. After three years as a guinea pig for the National Certificate of Educational 
Achievement (NCEA), I was being challenged to think, argue, and defend my views.  
David has that special ability of a great teacher to break down, but never cross, the barrier 
between teacher and student. I recall working up the courage to ask, aged 19, at the end of my 
second year of law, whether I could tutor the law of contract the following year. "I think you can do 
it. Do you think you can do it?" he asked. "Yes" I replied. I was eventually hired. He believed in me 
from the outset, and remains an ally, mentor and friend. I will be forever indebted to him for his 
teaching and advice. 
A quotation from Harold J Berman is stuck to his open door and is his guiding principle: "If a 
scholar is not a teacher his scholarship will be sterile … If a teacher is not a scholar his teaching will 
be superficial." A true teacher and scholar, David has met the balance perfectly.  
  
7 "University of Life: Police commissioner a law unto himself both at school and work" The Dominion Post 
(Wellington, 25 October 2010) at 10. 
8  Formerly a Professor at the University of Auckland and now a Professor at the University of South 
Australia. 
9  Charles Rickett "A 30 Year Legend" New Zealand Lawyer (Wellington, 25 January 2001) at 4. 
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III PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS FROM SARAH LESLIE 
"And remember, I like black pen." By the conclusion of David's customary final lecture on exam 
technique, most students know that the man is something of an extraordinary teacher. They will 
have read a mere dozen or so cases over the course, spent weeks discussing a few points, realised 
that half of the judgments are incontrovertibly wrong, and had the time of their academic lives.  In a 
course where David has mocked the Australians for their television-viewing habits, talked of 
accidentally terrorising a student he encountered in church and described an incident in a Crown car 
during which he told a certain judge that his judgments had slipped since he joined the Court of 
Appeal, it is quite something that the highlight of the course is still his treatment of the law. David 
has been known to relate the story of a young student who told him that the three hours she spent 
sitting his commercial law exam were the best three hours of her life. Despite his comment that "she 
didn't get out much", I suspect he knows that there are a few of us who relished the opportunity to 
demonstrate that we had risen to his challenge and absorbed his arguments (and, hopefully, the 
beginnings of an understanding of the law of contract). He taught me never to trust anything I read 
and to be suspicious of any judgment that, in the context of contract law at least, failed to give effect 
to the reasonable expectations of the parties. What, if anything, is the law of contract for apart from 
that?  
David's method is very simple. He takes his students through a limited number of cases, 
critiquing the judgments at every turn. In giving them time to read carefully ("there's too much 
assessment at this university and not enough learning!" is a catchcry of his) and challenging them 
with a series of compelling arguments as to why the judge failed properly to apply the law (or 
missed the point entirely), he helps his students understand the core principles of contract law.  It is 
this understanding that provides a complete answer to the occasional complaint that a contract 
student at Victoria will emerge understanding selected areas of the law only. Perhaps the best 
answer is that of Lord Goff, who once said that:10 
To understand a legal subject, it is necessary to penetrate it in depth at a certain point or points. A skim 
of superficial knowledge is not enough; and knowledge of the whole subject in depth is neither 
necessary nor, indeed, possible.  
The need for more of David's ilk is readily apparent in the numerous daft submissions and 
judgments today that apply textbook rules without any real understanding of the principles involved. 
David's achievements as a scholar and critic are well known. Much of his recent research 
concerns remedies and contract interpretation. With regard to the latter, there is no need to rehearse 
his convincing reasons in favour of the liberal approach to contract interpretation, which aims to get 
at what the parties actually agreed.11 His approach is largely in line with that of Lord Hoffmann in 
  
10 Robert Goff "Commercial Contracts and the Commercial Court" [1984] LMCLQ 382 at 382. 
11 David McLauchlan "Contract Interpretation: What Is It About?" (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 5.  
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Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society ("ICS").12 This approach 
holds that the task is to determine the meaning of the document recording the terms of the contract 
and that evidence of the "matrix of facts" is always admissible as an aid to interpretation. However, 
arbitrarily, evidence of prior negotiations is inadmissible. This particular point provided the basis for 
an indelible moment in the academic lives of students in David's 2005 contract class. Having 
completed a thorough study of the principles in ICS (and impressed on us the correct spelling of 
Lord Hoffmann's name – "two fs, two ns"), David turned to his Lordship's comment that evidence of 
prior negotiations was inadmissible. He argued that this view was incompatible with the ICS 
principles, and said that he had written to Lord Hoffmann, enclosing a relevant article, to tell him so. 
The class tittered appreciatively. But David was not finished yet. "And", he told us, "he wrote 
back!" Holding the class in thrall, he produced an envelope bearing a House of Lords seal and 
proceeded to read out the reply, which was something to the effect of: "Dear Professor McLauchlan, 
I quite agree with your views. However, we must proceed one step at a time". "Right," said David, 
"that's enough excitement for today. Class dismissed." Something that does not come across in his 
considered articles is something that is readily apparent to David's students: his wry sense of 
humour and perfectly-pitched sense of the theatrical. 
IV A NOTE ON NIGHTINGALE V BARFOOT & THOMPSON 
LTD 
One of the most important lessons Professor McLauchlan teaches his students is to trust their 
instincts when it comes to contract cases. Students should be suspicious of formalistic arguments 
that seem at odds with the merits, particularly if they deny an agreement that was made or foist on a 
party an agreement that was not. With this in mind, we examined Nightingale v Barfoot & 
Thompson Ltd. In that case, Mr Nightingale advised a real estate agent that he would not employ her 
to sell his property and that she would have to act for the purchaser. However, despite the fact that 
Mr Nightingale's evidence was accepted in its entirety and indeed preferred to that of the agent, both 
Courts found that an agency agreement did exist and Mr Nightingale was therefore liable to pay 
commission. This seems a perverse result. 
V FACTS OF NIGHTINGALE V BARFOOT AND THOMPSON 
We first recite the facts. Mr Nightingale listed his property for sale with Barfoot & Thompson 
("Barfoots"). It did not sell and the agency relationship was terminated. Several months later Ms 
Wan, an agent at Barfoots, approached Mr Nightingale. She said she had found prospective 
purchasers. Mr Nightingale agreed to allow her to show the purchasers the property on the condition 
that Barfoots act as agent for the purchasers. Ms Wan proceeded to show the prospective purchasers 
through the property and they made an offer, conveyed by Mr Godfrey, a senior agent at Barfoots. 
Mr Godfrey brought the offer, contained in an ADLS-REINZ form, to Mr Nightingale. Critically, 
  
12 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) [ICS].  
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the form contained cl 11, which provided that the sale was by the agent named on the front page, if 
any, and that the vendor would pay that agent's fees. Barfoots were named as the agent. Mr 
Nightingale rejected the offer and Mr Godfrey took the form away with him. Negotiations then 
proceeded by fax, at which stage Barfoots faxed only the front cover and execution page of the same 
form to Mr Nightingale. Initially, Mr Nightingale struck out the reference to Barfoots as agent, but, 
given the number of offers and counter offers, the form became illegible and was replaced by a fresh 
one. Mr Nightingale did not strike out the reference to Barfoots on the offer that was eventually 
accepted. Barfoots received the deposit from the purchasers and withheld their commission, 
forwarding the balance to Mr Nightingale. Mr Nightingale sued in the District Court to recover the 
commission.  
Mr Nightingale gave evidence in support of his claim. He conceded under cross-examination 
that, having been a real estate agent himself, he knew there was something like cl 11 in the standard 
form but thought that he would have to sign it in order to be bound to pay Barfoots ' commission. He 
agreed that he knew all of the other standard clauses contained in the contract (which had not been 
faxed to him) would apply. 
Judge Sharp accepted Mr Nightingale's evidence in its entirety.13 She made three key findings in 
his favour. First, he told Ms Wan clearly that he would not appoint Barfoots as his agent. Second, he 
struck out the reference to Barfoots on the first page of the form early in the fax negotiation process. 
Third, he genuinely thought that he would not be bound by cl 11 unless he signed it. Nevertheless, 
the Judge found for Barfoots. This decision was upheld on appeal by Venning J.  
In our view, it was unjust that Mr Nightingale was held bound to pay commission. In this article, 
therefore, we hope to show how a failure to identify the legal issues and advance appropriate 
arguments led to an unsatisfactory result. 
VI THE REAL ISSUE 
The issue at the heart of the case was whether Barfoots had a legal basis for withholding the 
commission. Counsel for Barfoots argued that they had such a right. However he did not argue that 
there was a contract of agency with Mr Nightingale, which would have contained all of the terms 
expected in an agency agreement such as scope of the agency, remuneration and duties to the 
principal. Instead, counsel argued that Barfoots were a third party beneficiary under the contract of 
sale. They were entitled to enforce that benefit under ss 4 and 8 of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. 
Barfoots also had to satisfy the formality requirement in s 62 of the Real Estate Agents Act 
1976: 
  
13 Nightingale (DC), above n 1, at [10].  
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62 Real estate agent to have written contract of agency   
No person shall be entitled to sue for or recover any commission, reward, or other valuable 
consideration in respect of any service or work performed by him or her as a real estate agent, unless— 
… 
(b)  His or her appointment to act as agent or perform that service or work is in writing signed either 
before or after the performance of that service or work by the person to be charged with the 
commission, reward, or consideration or by some person on his or her behalf lawfully authorised 
to sign the appointment. 
The earlier agency relationship had been terminated and Judge Sharp found there was no such 
relationship in existence at the time of the sale. Counsel for Barfoots relied on the reference to 
Barfoots in the contract between Mr Nightingale and the purchasers as appointing Barfoots as agent 
for Mr Nightingale in satisfaction of the writing requirement. A decision of the Court of Appeal held 
that naming the agent in the sale and purchase agreement was sufficient to satisfy s 62.14 
It is worth observing at this point that it seems conceptually odd that Barfoots would rely 
simultaneously on having satisfied s 62 and on the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. Had Barfoots 
actually been appointed as agent, surely they would rely on the agency contract with Mr 
Nightingale? Unfortunately, counsel for Mr Nightingale did not point out this difficulty. 
VII WERE BARFOOTS APPOINTED AS AGENT FOR MR 
NIGHTINGALE? 
It is clear from the wording of s 62 itself that no real estate agent may deduct commission unless 
appointed as agent and such appointment is evidenced in writing and signed by the principal. 
According to Bowstead on Agency:15 
The simplest way in which agency arises … is by an express agreement whether written or oral, by the 
principal, and acquiescence by the agent.  
If an agency appointment is contractual, normal rules of contract formation apply,16 and the 
scope of the agency is ascertained by ordinary principles of contractual construction.17 Any agency 
agreement between Barfoots and Mr Nightingale would have been a contractual one. It would have 
  
14 Houlahan v Royal Oak Realty (1993) Ltd [1996] 3 NZLR 513 (CA). 
15 Peter Watts and FMB Reynolds Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2010) at [2-029]. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, citing Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) at 502. 
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entailed Barfoots undertaking obligations, the primary one being to market the property, in return 
for remuneration if a sale resulted. 
Thus, the first issue should have been whether Mr Nightingale actually appointed Barfoots as his 
agent according to normal principles of contract formation, not those of interpretation to which 
Judge Sharp referred.18 Evidence of communications, negotiations and subsequent conduct were all 
admissible to determine whether a contract of agency had been concluded. The overall purpose of 
contract formation is to ascertain whether the parties objectively intended to be bound:19 
If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe 
that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief 
enters into the contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had 
intended to agree to the other party's terms. 
While the fact that Mr Nightingale signed a contract with the purchasers which acknowledged 
Barfoots as his agent (and satisfied the writing requirement in s 62) was a factor likely to have led 
Barfoots reasonably to believe that he was appointing them as agent, it is not necessarily 
determinative of the issue. A reasonable person in Barfoots' position could not have believed that 
Mr Nightingale intended to appoint them as agent. Mr Nightingale had clearly told Ms Wan that he 
would not, and had crossed out the reference to Barfoots on the front page in an earlier version of 
the sale and purchase agreement. Barfoots could not have had a reasonable belief because they knew 
that Mr Nightingale did not intend to be bound. That ought to have been the simple end of the 
matter had counsel for Mr Nightingale put the matter properly to the Judge.  
As it was, counsel for Mr Nightingale attempted a series of arguments as to the interpretation of 
the sale contract between Mr Nightingale and the vendors, which seem to miss the point entirely. 
First, he argued that cl 11 was akin to an exclusion clause and was "unduly onerous and 
sufficiently uncommon",20 and so had to be brought to Mr Nightingale's attention explicitly before 
he would be bound by it. Both Judge Sharp and Venning J rightly rejected this argument on the 
ground that cl 11 was nothing like an exclusion clause; it had been a standard term in the form for 
many years and was known to Mr Nightingale.21 
Second, he argued that the sale and purchase agreement consisted of the front and execution 
pages that were faxed to Mr Nightingale only. This was an untenable argument and unsupported by 
  
18 Nightingale (DC), above n 1, at [19]–[22]. 
19  Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 at 607, [1861–73] All ER 632. On the objective principle, see D W 
McLauchlan "The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification for Unilateral Mistake" (2008) 124 LQR 608 at 610–
614.  
20  Nightingale (DC), above n 1, at [31]. 
21  Ibid, at [34]; Nightingale (HC), above n 1, at [27]–[28].  
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the evidence. Mr Nightingale gave evidence that he knew that all of the standard terms would be 
included, even though he did not receive a copy of them. It would be a difficult, if not impossible, 
task to convince the Court that anyone, let alone Mr Nightingale, a former real estate agent, would 
reasonably believe that the standard terms had been omitted. The Judges rightly rejected this 
argument.22 
The result, then, was that the matter went before both courts on the basis that the issue was one 
of interpretation. Clause 11 was included in the standard terms and the reference to Barfoots on the 
front page remained in the final written document. None of the arguments raised on behalf of Mr 
Nightingale convinced them that, on the proper interpretation of the sale and purchase agreement, cl 
11 was not included. We agree that cl 11 was part of the contract between the purchasers and the 
vendors. However, neither Judge considered the logically prior question of whether Mr Nightingale 
had agreed to appoint Barfoots as his agent.  
VIII DOES S 62 CHANGE THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN AGENCY 
AGREEMENT? 
Both Judge Sharp and Venning J relied on a Court of Appeal judgment in Houlahan v Royal 
Oak Realty (1993) Ltd23 to justify their conclusion that cl 11 appointed Barfoots as agent for the 
vendors.24 In that case, prospective purchasers approached Royal Oak Realty, a real estate firm, to 
contact the Houlahans to see if they would sell a certain property. The Houlahans initially declined 
to sign Royal Oak's standard form of general authority. However they must then have decided to 
accept Royal Oak as their agent, since they signed a sale and purchase agreement which recorded 
Royal Oak as the agent. There are no facts to suggest they did not intend to do so. The agreement 
was not performed as not all of the conditions were met. Both parties treated it as lapsed, but it was 
not cancelled. The parties later signed a new sale and purchase agreement with no agent recorded. 
Royal Oak sued for commission and succeeded. 
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the second agreement was essentially a variation 
of the first and thus the effect of cl 12.2 (now cl 11.1) was that the agent was still entitled to 
commission. Richardson P and Henry J dissented. All of the Judges agreed that the sale and 
purchase agreement was an agency appointment between the agent and the vendor. Gault J held that 
the sale and purchase agreement constituted:25 
... the appointment by the vendors of [Royal Oak] as agent for the purpose of satisfying the requirements 
in s 62(b) of the Real Estate Agents Act 1976 and ha[s] contractual effect between the vendors and the 
  
22  Ibid. 
23  Houlahan v Royal Oak Realty (1993) Ltd, above n 14.  
24  Nightingale (DC), above n 1, at [37]; Nightingale (HC), above n 1, at [34]. 
25  Houlahan v Royal Oak Realty (1993) Ltd, above n 14, at 522.  
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agent. As with any contract it is to be interpreted on an objective assessment of what was contemplated 
by the parties.  
But the main issue before the Court was whether the variation was effective, not the effect of what is 
now cl 11. 
Houlahan can be distinguished from the present facts. In Houlahan there was nothing to suggest 
anything other than that the Houlahans had led Royal Oak to believe that they did intend to be 
bound to a contract of agency. Although they declined to sign the original appointment, they did not 
demur in signing the contract that clearly stipulated Royal Oak would be the agent. In fact, that 
agreement went further than Mr Nightingale's in that it also stipulated what Royal Oak's commission 
would be. It seems clear that the Houlahans agreed to appoint Royal Oak as their agent before 
signing the agreement and the Court took the view that the parties intended cl 12 to operate as a 
contract within a contract, even though Royal Oak had not signed it.26 This would give it 
contractual effect between the Houlahans and Royal Oak. However, this was a factual finding, 
rather than a legal principle that the inclusion of cl 11 in a sale and purchase agreement will always 
serve to appoint the agent as such. 
In most cases, cl 11 is intended simply to provide written evidence of a prior existing oral 
contract between the vendor and the agent for the purpose of s 62 if there is no such contract in 
writing. It is not meant to act as the appointment itself. Many of the terms that might be expected to 
be included in an agency appointment contract do not feature in most sale and purchase agreements. 
These might include a fee schedule, clauses stipulating what the agent must do in performance of 
the contract and termination provisions. It may be that the facts of Houlahan, including the fact that 
Royal Oak's fee schedule was included in the contract, led the Court to conclude that cl 11 was 
intended to act as the appointment, but such a conclusion will be rare. Indeed, in Mr Nightingale's 
case, by relying on the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 to recover, Barfoots were conceding they were 
not party to the sale and purchase agreement.  
Houlahan should not have been relied on to conclude that Mr Nightingale appointed Barfoots as 
his agent. Although the formalistic requirements of s 62 were met, the logically prior condition that 
there must be a contract was not. There could not be an enforceable contract on the facts because 
Barfoots could not reasonably believe that Mr Nightingale intended to be bound. 
IX WERE BARFOOTS ESTOPPED FROM RELYING ON THE 
CONTRACTS (PRIVITY) ACT 1982? 
Another question that can be raised about both Judges' reasoning relates to Barfoots' reliance on 
the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. Section 4 provides: 
  
26  The agent's signature is not required for a contract to be binding. See Durrell v Evans (1862) 1 H & C 174 at 
191, 158 ER 848 (Ex) at 855, the name of the agent printed on the contract will suffice. 
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Where a promise contained in a deed or contract confers, or purports to confer, a benefit on a person, 
designated by name, description, or reference to a class, who is not a party to the deed or contract 
(whether or not the person is in existence at the time when the deed or contract is made), the promisor 
shall be under an obligation, enforceable at the suit of that person, to perform that promise: 
Provided that this section shall not apply to a promise which, on the proper construction of the deed or 
contract, is not intended to create, in respect of the benefit, an obligation enforceable at the suit of that 
person. 
The first requirement of the section is that there is a promise for the benefit of a third party, 
contained in a deed or contract. The words of cl 11 are: 
Agent 
11.1 If the name of a licensed real estate agent is stated on the front page of this agreement, it is 
acknowledged that the sale evidenced by this agreement has been made through that agent whom the 
vendor appoints as the vendor's agent to effect the sale. The vendor shall pay the agent's charges 
including GST for effecting such sale.  
The judgments contain little discussion on this point. But we agree that there is a promise, 
namely to pay the agent's charges. This confers a benefit on Barfoots: they may claim commission. 
The proviso is not met because there is nothing in the contract to suggest that the parties did not 
intend the clause to be enforceable by Barfoots. Such indicators were all extraneous to the contract. 
However, Barfoots were arguably estopped from relying on s 4. The defence of estoppel is 
protected under s 9(2) of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. Under that section, the promisor (Mr 
Nightingale) has available to him any defence that would have been available had Barfoots been a 
party to the sale and purchase agreement. One such defence is that of promissory estoppel, which 
has long been available as a shield against legal rights being enforced by a party who has previously 
stated that they will not be enforced. Thus in Jackson v Blagojevich,27 a lessor who had represented 
that a lease could run on was estopped from denying that it had been renewed when the tenant 
stayed in occupation in difficult trading conditions. Promissory estoppel has three requirements: 
there must be a promise or representation, it must be relied on by the promisee, and that reliance 
must be to the detriment of the promisee if the promisor is permitted to resile from the promise.28 
When Ms Wan agreed to show the prospective purchasers through Mr Nightingale's property on 
the condition that Barfoots would act for the purchasers, she made a representation to that effect that 
  
27  Jackson v Blagojevich (1997) 3 NZ Conv C 192 (HC), at 564.  
28  Such a proposition barely needs authority, but see for example Gillies v Keogh [1989] 2 NZLR 327 (HC) at 
346 per Richardson J.  
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would bind Barfoots. A clear and unambiguous representation is required for estoppel to succeed.29 
It is not entirely clear from the account of the evidence given by either Judge exactly what she said. 
Certainly, however, Mr Nightingale reasonably understood by her act of showing the property to the 
eventual purchasers that she was agreeing to his stipulation that he would not appoint Barfoots as 
agent. He permitted her to show the vendors the property in reliance on this representation. Finally, 
he would suffer the detriment of the loss of part of the sale price when Barfoots resiled from that 
representation and deducted the commission. Thus it is arguable that Barfoots were estopped from 
relying on their legal rights under the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. 
Counsel for Mr Nightingale did not argue estoppel in the District Court. It was raised for the 
first time in the High Court but Barfoots objected on the basis that the point had not been properly 
pleaded. Similar objections were made to counsel's attempt to present a Fair Trading Act 1986 
argument (presumably accusing Ms Wan of misleading or deceptive conduct under s 9) and a 
collateral contract argument. Venning J held that the points raised issues of fact and evidence and 
were not merely limited points of law and that the new points could not fairly be raised in the High 
Court.30 The evidence as recorded by Judge Sharp suggests that the issue of what was actually said 
by Ms Wan and Mr Godfrey was not the subject of cross-examination, which may have been 
necessary if estoppel was to be argued.  
However, counsel was wrong not to push the point, instead conceding that the case "stands or 
falls on whether cl 11.1 was incorporated into the contract and whether there was an appointment of 
the respondent as the appellants' agent".31 Even if both of those points had been decided in Barfoots ' 
favour, there was still the outstanding issue of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, because Barfoots 
argued on the basis of s 4, not on the basis of a contractual right to commission. In this sense, the 
case diverged from Houlahan. But had Barfoots argued that cl 11 constituted a valid agency 
agreement, they might also have been estopped from relying on their contractual rights. 
X WOULD THE RESULT BE DIFFERENT TODAY? 
Although it will provide no comfort for Mr Nightingale, the new legislative regime of the Real 
Estate Agents Act 2008 would have led to a different result. The Act came into force on the 16 
September 2008 and replaced the Real Estate Agents Act 1976. Section 126(a) is more prescriptive 
than s 62. It provides that an agent is not entitled to any commission or expenses from a client for 
real estate work unless there is "a written agency agreement" signed by or on behalf of the client and 
  
29  Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flora Petrolera Ecutoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983] QB 529 (CA) at 
534. 
30 Nightingale (HC), above n 1, at [14].  
31 Ibid, at [15].  
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the agent.32 Section 126(b) provides that a copy of that agreement must be given to the client within 
48 hours of the agreement being signed by the client. It will be difficult to fit cl 11.1 of the sale and 
purchase agreement within the stricter language of s 126 because agents do not sign sale and 
purchase agreements. The agreement is intended to be a contract between vendor and purchaser, not 
between vendor and agent. In addition, s 128(1) requires the agency agreement to disclose all 
rebates, discounts and commissions that the agent will receive in relation to the expenses. Such a 
clause does not appear in the standard ADLS-REINZ precedent. Accordingly, it would be more 
difficult for a court deciding a similar case under the new regime to find that the requirements of the 
new Act had been satisfied. However, whatever the formality requirements, courts should find 
agency agreements only where such an agreement exists according to basic principles of contract 
law. 
XI CONCLUSION 
The idea for this article came from an instinct that Nightingale v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd could 
not have been correctly decided. How could a real estate firm who knew the vendor did not intend to 
appoint the firm as agent nevertheless have a legal right to withhold commission? David teaches his 
students to trust their first instincts as to where the justice of the case lies, and then trace through the 
legal reasoning to see where it may have gone wrong. The answer will usually lie in a failure to 
consider the first principles of contract law. Counsel for Mr Nightingale failed to see the agency 
agreement as a contract and thus subject to the objective principle. Barfoots could not reasonably 
believe that Mr Nightingale intended to be bound by cl 11. Accordingly, there could be no contract. 
Counsel also, at least in the District Court, failed to consider estoppel.  
Contract law is a complex area of law. It becomes all the more complex when lawyers lose sight 
of first principles. David offers a steadfast, principled and clear articulation of the law of contract in 
his many publications and his law courses. His scholarship is authoritative for students, practitioners 
and judges alike. We can do no more than quote from Thomas J in one of his last judgments, sitting 
as a Supreme Court judge:33 
I pause to pay, or repay, a tribute to the learned professor. His work to bring some logic and cohesion 
into the task of contractual interpretation has been as outstanding as it has been tireless. Indeed, since 
argument was heard on this appeal, Professor McLauchlan has published another article under the title 
"Contract Formation, Contract Interpretation and Subsequent Conduct".34 That article exhibits the same 
impeccable scholarship that has marked Professor McLauchlan's earlier essays. I for one am indebted to 
  
32  Although the authenticated signature fiction may apply to limit the effect of this section. See Leeman v 
Stocks [1951] Ch 941 (Ch).  
33 Gibbons Holdings Ltd v Wholesale Distributors Ltd [2007] NZSC 37, [2008] 1 NZLR 277. 
34 David McLauchlan "Contract Formation, Contract Interpretation and Subsequent Conduct" (2006) 25 UQLJ 
77. 
16 (2011) 42 VUWLR 
him. It will undoubtedly be a matter of some satisfaction to him that four members of this Court have 
now decided that evidence of subsequent conduct may be admitted in appropriate cases. The fact that 
two of the four do not consider that the evidence of subsequent conduct in this particular case is of 
assistance does not derogate from the fact that the principle has now been established.    
We offer our sincerest congratulations to a tireless, rigorous teacher and scholar, to a mentor and 
friend on his 40th anniversary. We can only hope to have the privilege to pay him tribute again in 
another decade. 
 
